

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 25

4 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

RECISION OF C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. At its 8th meeting, the Intelligence Advisory Board concurred in the proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence that the Central Intelligence Group undertake the responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. In view of the above action, C.I.G. Directive No. 8 is hereby rescinded

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.

CONFIDENTIALCOPY NO. 609 May 1946*Rescinded 4 Oct*CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;

b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;

c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render

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unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in

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accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 5, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:

- (1) Department of State.
- (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation (to include fingerprint files).
- (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
- (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
- (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
- (6) Credit agencies.

b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:

- (1) Birth.
- (2) Citizenship.
- (3) Education.
- (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned,

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constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Division, War Department and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate.

10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

11. All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

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12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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COPY NO. 56

4 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

RECISION OF C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. At its 8th meeting, the Intelligence Advisory Board concurred in the proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence that the Central Intelligence Group undertake the responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. In view of the above action, C.I.G. Directive No. 8 is hereby rescinded

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.

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BRIEF ON SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

For Use at Next I.A.E. Meeting

C.I.G. Directive No. 8 established security standards and procedures for clearance of personnel assigned to C.I.G. This directive was based upon the arrangement existing at that time under which the Departments assigned personnel to C.I.G. The Departments, therefore, assumed the responsibility for conducting necessary security investigations.

Two developments have made that directive out of date. First, it is now clear that in the future the majority of C.I.G. personnel must be recruited from sources other than the Departments. Second, the War Department finds it impossible to carry out the necessary investigations because of reduced personnel ceiling.

Under the circumstances C.I.G. will itself assume responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel. In doing this C.I.G. will adhere to the same security standards established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 and will, of course, check with the Departments in each case. Incidentally it would be greatly appreciated if the Departments would handle these C.I.G. checks as a matter of priority.

Of course, when Departments nominate individuals in the future for C.I.G., it will be assumed that the nominating Department has at least made a preliminary check of its own files to determine that the individual nominated meets C.I.G. security standards.

It is also assumed that the Departments will complete all investigations initiated up to this time.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Intelligence Division, G-2

Washington, D. C.

6 September 1946

WID 918

SUBJECT: Loyalty and Fitness Investigations

TO: Director, Central Intelligence Group
Room 2166
New War Department Building
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to CIG Directive No. 8, and particularly to paragraph 10 thereof which requires the investigation by the War Department of personnel furnished by the War Department to the Central Intelligence Group.

2. The provisions of the cited directive are such as to require a rather comprehensive investigation for the purpose of establishing not only the loyalty of the individuals concerned but also their fitness for the positions for which they are contemplated. This entails the employment of considerable manpower both for making the inquiries and also for the clerical work incident to the preparation of reports.

3. The War Department has found it necessary to curtail drastically all routine type loyalty and fitness investigations. This has been necessitated by personnel reductions not only within the Intelligence Division but also within the operating intelligence offices of the army areas and the Military District of Washington. This latter aspect is of particular importance since it is these subordinate agencies that have to do the actual detailed work. This subject of loyalty investigations was discussed very recently with the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 of the army areas and the Military District of Washington. It was the consensus that investigations of this type could not be continued. It is true that the volume of investigations required by the Central Intelligence Group is not excessive but they are of the same nature as the great number of equally important investigations that are being discontinued.

4. It is regretted that it will not be practicable to comply with the provisions of CIG Directive No. 8.

S. J. CHAMBERLIN
Major General, G. S. C.
Director of Intelligence

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12 Sept. 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, WDGS

Subject: Loyalty and Fitness Investigations

References: a. C.I.G. Directive No. 8
b. Memorandum to Director, C.I.G.,
From Director of Intelligence WDGS,
same subject, dated 6 September 1946.

It is noted in Reference b. that the War Department finds it impracticable to comply with the provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 as regards the investigation of personnel furnished by the War Department to the Central Intelligence Group.

In view of this fact, the Central Intelligence Group is preparing a revision of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 which will provide equivalent security requirements for C.I.G. personnel but will establish practicable procedures for security clearances. This revision will be submitted for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board at the earliest practicable date.

Pending concurrence by the Intelligence Advisory Board in a revision of C.I.G. No. 8 the Central Intelligence Group will itself undertake all security clearances initiated subsequent to this date on personnel furnished to C.I.G. by the War Department.

It is assumed that the War Department will complete all security clearances which have been initiated within that Department prior to this date.

/s/

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central
Intelligence

Security Branch, Coll. & Dis.
Security, Personnel & Admin.
Central Records (2)
Executive Registry
Return to Mr. Lay

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
(Revised 10 Sept 1946)

not sent

42/

FROM	TO	INITIALS	DATE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE			
✓ EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR			
SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR			
EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR			
ADVISORY COUNCIL			
EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION			
CENTRAL RECORDS			
SECRETARY, NIA	✓		
CHIEF, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF			
ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS			
ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION			
ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION			
CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH			

___ APPROVAL ___ INFORMATION ___ DIRECT REPLY
___ ACTION ___ RETURN ___ COMMENT
___ RECOMMENDATION ___ PREPARATION OF REPLY ___ FILE
___ SIGNATURE ___ CONCURRENCE ___ DISPATCH

REMARKS:

The Director wants me to examine this further - as to its necessity. Will you see me about it? Wright

TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED
 (Sender will circle classification Top and Bottom)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
 INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
 (Revised 10 Sept 1946)

FROM	TO	INITIALS	DATE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	5		
EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR	11	Wright	
SECRETARY TO THE DIRECTOR			
EXECUTIVE OFFICE: ASST. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR		far	Oct 7
ADVISORY COUNCIL			
EXECUTIVE FOR PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION			
CENTRAL RECORDS			
✓ SECRETARY, NIA	6		
CHIEF, INTERDEPARTMENTAL STAFF			
ASST. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS			
ASST. DIRECTOR, RESEARCH & EVALUATION			
ASST. DIRECTOR, COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION			
CHIEF, SECURITY BRANCH	2	JS	7/10
	1	CLB	7/10

ILLEGIB

⑤ APPROVAL

___ INFORMATION

___ DIRECT REPLY

___ ACTION

✓ RETURN to ⑥

___ COMMENT

___ RECOMMENDATION

___ PREPARATION OF REPLY

___ FILE

⑤ SIGNATURE

① ② ③ ④ CONCURRENCE

___ DISPATCH

REMARKS:

TOP SECRET

SECRET

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RESTRICTED

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP **CONFIDENTIAL**
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EDDY
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN
ADMIRAL INGLIS
GENERAL McDONALD

SUBJECT: Clearance of Personnel for Duties
with Central Intelligence Group

REFERENCE: Minutes of I.A.B. 8th Meeting, Item 2

1. At its 8th meeting, the Intelligence Advisory Board concurred in the proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence that the Central Intelligence Group undertake the responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8, except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. At the same meeting the Intelligence Advisory Board noted without objection the following statements:

a. That it would be greatly appreciated if each department would handle security checks of its own records on C.I.G. personnel, when requested, as a matter of priority.

b. That, when departments nominate individuals in the future for C.I.G., the nominating department will, based upon its own knowledge, certify in writing as to the nominee's loyalty and fitness for such duty.

c. That each department will complete all security investigations on C.I.G. personnel initiated prior to 1 October 1946, except those on which the departments have not yet taken any action.

3. In order that there may be no misunderstanding on the above points, it is requested that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board confirm his acceptance of these statements by returning the enclosed memorandum form.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Clearance of Personnel for Duties
with Central Intelligence Group

REFERENCE: Memorandum for I.A.B. from Director of Central
Intelligence, same subject, dated

1. This is to confirm my agreement with the following statements of the Director of Central Intelligence in the I.A.B. 8th Meeting:

a. That security checks of this agency's files on C.I.G. personnel, when requested, will be handled as a matter of priority.

b. That, when this agency nominates individuals in the future for C.I.G., such nominations will be accompanied by a written statement to the effect that this agency, based upon its own knowledge of the individual recommended, certifies to his loyalty and fitness for such duty.

c. That this agency will complete all security investigations on C.I.G. personnel initiated prior to 1 October 1946, except for those on which this agency had not taken action.

(Signature)

(Title)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIALCOPY NO. 369 May 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;

b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;

c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render

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CIG Directive #8

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unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in

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CIG Directive #8

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accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:

- (1) Department of State.
- (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation (to include fingerprint files).
- (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
- (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
- (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
- (6) Credit agencies.

b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:

- (1) Birth.
- (2) Citizenship.
- (3) Education.
- (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, ✓

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CIG Directive #8

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constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Division, War Department and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate.

10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

11. All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

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12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

25 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION
CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND
PLANNING STAFF
CHIEF, ADVISORY COUNCIL
✓ SECRETARY, WIA

SUBJECT: Security Clearances

1. It is requested that the personnel under your jurisdiction be instructed that prospective civilian, military, or Naval personnel to be assigned to CIG are not permitted to attempt to obtain their own security clearance from the State, War or Navy Departments. Such an instance has arisen which suggests the necessity for this memorandum.

2. In all cases, security investigations will be handled by the Security Division, Personnel and Administrative Branch.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Deputy Executive for Personnel
and Administration

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COPY NO. 43

4 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

REVISION OF C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. At its 8th meeting, the Intelligence Advisory Board concurred in the proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence that the Central Intelligence Group undertake the responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. In view of the above action, C.I.G. Directive No. 8 is hereby rescinded

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr Kay
FROM : Col Wright
SUBJECT:

DATE: 28 Aug 46

At your convenience will
you talk to me re the
attached paper.

Wright

Approved For Release 2006/01/10 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100060015-2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive for P & A DATE: 28 August 1946

FROM : Security Officer

SUBJECT: Change of CIG Directive No. 8

STATINTL
STATINTL

1. In a conference with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] held on 27 August 1946, it was proposed that CIG Directive No. 8 dated 9 May 1946 be changed by adding one paragraph which will be paragraph 14 and will read as follows:

" The Director of Central Intelligence will insure that a security clearance of all personnel procured from sources other than the member departments of NIA is effected in accordance with the foregoing provisions."

STATINTL

2. [REDACTED] has agreed to initiate action to bring this

proposed change before the IAB, but it is necessary to have some indication as to whether or not it may be approved so that I may properly ~~present~~ *prepare* the part of the cable and letter to the overseas missions as relates to security.

3. Therefore, it is requested that this matter be brought to the attention of the Executive Director for immediate determination as to whether this proposed change will or will not be approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

STATINTL

[REDACTED]

CLAUDE D. BARTON
Lt. Colonel, Inf.
Security Officer

Check CIG #8

CONFIDENTIALD R A F TBRIEF ON SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

For Use at Next I.A.B. Meeting

C.I.G. Directive No. 8 established security standards and procedures for clearance of personnel assigned to C.I.G. This directive was based upon the arrangement existing at that time under which the Departments assigned personnel to C.I.G. The Departments, therefore, assumed the responsibility for conducting necessary security investigations.

Two developments have made that directive out of date. First, it is now clear that in the future the majority of C.I.G. personnel must be recruited from sources other than the Departments. Second, the War Department finds it impossible to carry out the necessary investigations because of reduced personnel ceiling.

Under the circumstances C.I.G. will itself conduct all security investigations required to clear its personnel. In doing this C.I.G. will adhere to the same security standards established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 and will, of course, check with the Departments in each case. Incidentally it would be greatly appreciated if the Departments would handle these C.I.G. checks as a matter of priority.

Of course, when Departments nominate individuals in the future to C.I.G., it will be assumed that the nominating Department has at least made a preliminary check on its own files to determine that the individual nominated meets C.I.G. security standards.

It is also assumed that the Departments will complete all investigations initiated up to this time.

JSL:hlf

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, WDGS

Subject: Loyalty and Fitness Investigations

References: a. C.I.G. Directive No. 8 ✓
 b. Memorandum to Director, C.I.G.,
 From Director of Intelligence WDGS,
 same subject, dated 6 September 1946.

It is noted in Reference b. that the War Department finds it impracticable to comply with the provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 as regards the investigation of personnel furnished by the War Department to the Central Intelligence Group.

In view of this fact, the Central Intelligence Group is preparing a revision of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 which will provide equivalent security requirements for C.I.G. personnel but will establish practicable procedures for security clearances. This revision will be submitted for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board at the earliest practicable date.

Pending concurrence by the Intelligence Advisory Board in a revision of C.I.G. No. 8 the Central Intelligence Group will itself undertake all security clearances initiated subsequent to this date on personnel furnished to C.I.G. by the War Department.

It is assumed that the War Department will complete all security clearances which have been initiated within that Department prior to this date.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
 Lieutenant General, USA
 Director of Central
 Intelligence

Security Branch, Coll. & Dis.
 Security, Personnel & Admin.
 Central Records (2)
 Executive Registry
 Return to Mr. Lay—

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

From	Office	To
	Director of Central Intelligence	
	Deputy Director	
✓	Executive to the Director	
	Secretary to the Director	
	Executive Director	
	Asst. Executive Director	① ✓
	Executive for Operations	
	Executive for Control	
	Secretary, NIA	② ✓
	Asst. Director for Spec. Operations	
	Asst. Director for Collection	
	Asst. Director for Research	
	Asst. Director for Dissemination	
	Chief, Interdepartmental Staff	
	Executive for Pers. & Admin	③ ✓
	Central Records	④

APPROVAL	PREPARATION OF REPLY
① ② ③ ACTION	CONCURRENCE
RECOMMENDATION	DIRECT REPLY
SIGNATURE	COMMENT
INFORMATION	④ FILE
RETURN	MAIL

REMARKS: To be used as a basis for
voiding CIG 8 and the establishment
of our own system.

ILLEGIB

(1742-9)

ILLEGIB

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C.

164

MID 918

6 September 1946

SUBJECT: Loyalty and Fitness Investigations

TO: Director, Central Intelligence Group
Room 2166
New War Department Building
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to CIG Directive No. 8, and particularly to paragraph 10 thereof which requires the investigation by the War Department of personnel furnished by the War Department to the Central Intelligence Group.

2. The provisions of the cited directive are such as to require a rather comprehensive investigation for the purpose of establishing not only the loyalty of the individuals concerned but also their fitness for the positions for which they are contemplated. This entails the employment of considerable manpower both for making the inquiries and also for the clerical work incident to the preparation of reports.

3. The War Department has found it necessary to curtail drastically all routine type loyalty and fitness investigations. This has been necessitated by personnel reductions not only within the Intelligence Division but also within the operating intelligence offices of the army areas and the Military District of Washington. This latter aspect is of particular importance since it is these subordinate agencies that have to do the actual detailed work. This subject of loyalty investigations was discussed very recently with the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 of the army areas and the Military District of Washington. It was the consensus that investigations of this type could not be continued. It is true that the volume of investigations required by the Central Intelligence Group is not excessive but they are of the same nature as the great number of equally important investigations that are being discontinued.

4. It is regretted that it will not be practicable to comply with the provisions of CIG Directive No. 8.

Major General, G. S. C.
Director of Intelligence



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8 MAY 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: C.I.G. Policy on Security Clearance of Personnel.

The following recommendations are submitted in connection with comments received from the Department of State, Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding suggested amendments to C.I.G. 7:

1. The Chief of Naval Intelligence recommends that paragraph 7, page 3, be amended to provide for a review of all reports of investigations by a screening committee to consist of one representative each from the State Department; Military Intelligence Division, 9-2; Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, 4-2 and then the final review by the Security Officer of the Central Intelligence Group. Paragraph 7 in its original form provides for the review of investigative reports by the Security Officer of C.I.G. It is believed that the proposed additional review by a screening committee is neither necessary nor desirable because:

a. Review of the investigative reports by the Security Officer, C.I.G. will accomplish the primary purpose of the provision in question, which is to permit of extraction from the reports of certain pertinent information desired for C.I.G. files. It is for the further purpose of enabling the Security Officer to familiarize himself with the contents of the reports so that he will be in a position to brief the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the acceptability of nominees to the C.I.G.

b. The only reports in which all the departments have an interest are those in which a nominee fails to meet the requirements of the directive and an exception is requested. Paragraph 13 of C.I.G. 7 provides that exceptions may be granted on the basis of unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Thus, the reports of investigations will be available to all departments in such cases.

c. It is believed that the requirements set up in C.I.G. 7

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for the investigation and clearance of individuals for assignment to the C.I.G. will permit each department to make the proper determination as to an individual's eligibility and that a review of investigative reports of one department by the other departments would result in delaying the clearance and would serve no useful purpose. It is recommended that the suggested amendment, paragraph 7, not be concurred in and further, that paragraph 7 be retained in its present form.

2. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of State suggests that paragraph 13 be amended to require only the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the department nominating the person for duty with the Central Intelligence Group in order to effect an exception to any of the provisions of C.I.G. 7. Paragraph 13 in its original form required the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group to effect exceptions. This provision is a saving clause that permits exceptions in cases where extenuating circumstances may make it desirable to utilize an individual's services even though the individual does not meet with the set standards. It is believed that all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group are entitled to knowledge of any exceptions being made on individuals nominated for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. It is, therefore, recommended that the suggested amendment to paragraph 13 not be concurred in and further that the provision in question be retained in its original form.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation suggests that the provision that a minimum of ten (10) years honorable government service, there being no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, be accepted as a basis for clearance may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group. It is stated that there are many persons who have been in government employment for a period of ten (10) years or more and have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty are concerned but who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. It is believed that there is a security danger unless an adequate check is made to determine the existence of any derogatory information that may have developed subsequent to the date of any existent investigative report or during the entire period of the individual's government employment. To provide for an adequate check, it is recommended that there be incorporated in paragraph 9 a final sentence worded as follows:

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"In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service, War Department and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate."

4. As a result of further careful consideration of this directive, it is recommended that two other minor changes be effected which, it is believed, will clarify the intent of two particular provisions thereof. The suggested changes are as follows:

a. Page 4, paragraph 6 a (2) include after "Federal Bureau of Investigation" the words in parentheses "(to include fingerprint files)."

b. Page 5, paragraph 11, change lines 1 and 2 to read "All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative."

The change suggested in a. above is believed necessary to insure that all agencies will request the F.B.I. to effect a fingerprint check as well as the usual records check. The change recommended in b. above is considered necessary to clearly indicate that the provisions of C.I.G. 7 apply only to the personnel actually assigned to or attached for duty with the C.I.G.

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[Redacted Signature]

Captain, USN
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff

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CONFIDENTIALCOPY NO. 379 May 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;

b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;

c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render

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unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in

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accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:

- (1) Department of State.
- (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation (to include fingerprint files).
- (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
- (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
- (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
- (6) Credit agencies.

b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:

- (1) Birth.
- (2) Citizenship.
- (3) Education.
- (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned,

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constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Division, War Department and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate.

10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

11. All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

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12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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COPY NO. _____

9 May 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the ~~Unanimous~~ Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

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2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;

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c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

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4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. 8 and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

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- (1) Birth.
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c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. In

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11. All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with

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regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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COPY NO. 28

4 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

RECISION OF C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. At its 8th meeting, the Intelligence Advisory Board concurred in the proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence that the Central Intelligence Group undertake the responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. In view of the above action, C.I.G. Directive No. 8 is hereby rescinded

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.

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CONFIDENTIALCOPY NO. 269 May 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPC.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
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4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

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12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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COPY NO. 27

4 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

RECISION OF C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. 8

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. At its 8th meeting, the Intelligence Advisory Board concurred in the proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence that the Central Intelligence Group undertake the responsibility for all future security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject to the same security standards as established in C.I.G. Directive No. 8 except for exemptions authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. In view of the above action, C.I.G. Directive No. 8 is hereby rescinded

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.



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